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Abstract: 
Not only did Turing help found one of the most exciting areas of modern science 
(computer science), but it may be that his contribution to our understanding of our 
physical reality is greater than we had hitherto supposed. Here I explore the path that 
Alan Turing would have certainly liked to follow, that of complexity science, which was 
launched in the wake of his seminal work on computability and structure formation. In 
particular, I will explain how the theory of algorithmic probability based on Turing’s 
universal machine can also explain how structure emerges at the most basic level, hence 
reconnecting two of Turing’s most cherished topics: computation and pattern formation 
 
 
Alan Turing established such a direct connection between the concept of the algorithm 
and a purely mechanical process that he left few doubts concerning the physical implementation 
and generality of his programmable machines. At the beginning of the twentieth century and 
through the end of the Second World War, computers were human, not electronic, mainly 
women. The work of a computer consisted precisely in solving tedious arithmetical operations 
with paper and pencil. This was looked upon as work of an inferior order. 
At an international mathematics conference in 1928, David Hilbert and Wilhelm 
Ackermann suggested the possibility that a mechanical process could be devised that was 
capable of proving all mathematical assertions. This notion is referred to as 
Entscheidungsproblem (in German), or ‘the decision problem’. If a human computer did no 
more than execute a mechanical process, it was not difficult to imagine that arithmetic would be 
amenable to a similar sort of mechanization. The origin of Entscheidungsproblem dates back to 
Gottfried Leibniz, who having (around 1672) succeeded in building a machine based on the 
ideas of Blaise Pascal that was capable of performing arithmetical operations (named 
Staffelwalze or the Step Reckoner), imagined a machine of the same kind that would be capable 
of manipulating symbols to determine the truth value of mathematical principles. To this end 
Leibniz devoted himself to conceiving a formal universal language, which he designated 
characteristica universalis, a language that would encompass, among other things, binary 
language and the definition of binary arithmetic. 
In 1931, Kurt Gödel arrived at the conclusion that Hilbert’s intention (also referred to as 
‘Hilbert’s programme’) of proving all theorems by mechanizing mathematics was not possible 
under certain reasonable assumptions. Gödel advanced a formula that codified an arithmetical 
truth in arithmetical terms and that could not be proved without arriving at a contradiction. Even 
worse, it implied that there was no set of axioms that contained arithmetic free of true formulae 
that could not be proved. 
In 1944, Emil Post, another key figure in the development of the concepts of 
computation and computability (focusing especially on the limits of computation) found that 
this problem was intimately related to one of the twenty-three problems (the tenth) that Hilbert, 
speaking at the Sorbonne in Paris, had declared the most important challenges for twentieth-
century mathematics. 
Usually, Hilbert’s programme is considered a failure, though in fact it is anything but. 
Even though it is true that Gödel debunked the notion that what was true could be proved, 
presenting a negative solution to the ‘problem of decision’, and Martin Davis (independently of 
Julia Robinson) used Gödel’s negative result to provide a negative solution to Hilbert’s tenth 
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problem (the argument for which was completed by Yuri Matiyasevich), Hilbert’s supposedly 
failed programme originated what we now know as Computer Science, the field that wouldn’t 
have been possible without Alan M. Turing’s concept of the universal machine. 
 
One machine for everything 
 
Not long after Gödel, Alan M. Turing made his appearance. Turing contemplated the 
problem of decision in much cruder terms. If the act of performing arithmetical operations is 
mechanical, why not substitute a mechanical device for the human computer? Turing’s work 
represented the first abstract description of the digital general-purpose computer as we know it 
today. Turing defined what in his article he termed an ‘a’ computer (for ‘automatic’), now 
known as a Turing machine. 
A Turing machine is an abstract device which reads or writes symbols on a tape one at a 
time and can change its operation according to what it reads, and move forwards or backwards 
through the tape. The machine stops when it reaches a certain configuration (a combination of 
what it reads and its internal state). It is said that a Turing machine produces an output if the 
Turing machine halts, while the locations on the tape the machine has visited represent the 
output produced. 
The most remarkable idea advanced by Turing is his demonstration that there is an ‘a’ 
machine that is able to read other ‘a’ machines and behave as they would for an input s. In other 
words, Turing proved that it was not necessary to build a new machine for each different task; a 
single machine that could be reprogrammed sufficed. This erases the distinction between 
program and data, as well as between software and hardware, as one can always codify data as 
a program to be executed by another Turing machine and vice versa, just as one can always 
build a universal machine to execute any program and vice versa. 
Turing also proved that there are Turing machines that never halt, and if a Turing 
machine is to be universal and hence able to simulate any other Turing machine or computer 
program, it is actually expected that it will never halt for an infinite number of inputs of a 
certain type (while halting for an infinite number of inputs of some other type). And this is what 
Turing would have expected, given Gödel’s results and what he wanted to demonstrate: that 
Hilbert’s mechanisation of mathematics was impossible. This result is known as the 
undecidability of the halting problem. 
In his seminal article Turing defined not only the basis of what we today know as digital 
general-purpose computers, but also software, programming and subroutines. And thus without 
a doubt it represents the best answer to date that we have to the question ‘What is an algorithm?’  
In fact in Alan Turing’s work on his universal machine, he even introduced the concept of a 
subroutine that helped him in his machine construction. These notions are today the cornerstone 
of the field that Turing, more than anyone else, helped establish, viz. Computer Science. 
 
Once we approach the problem of defining what an algorithm is and arrive at the 
concept of universality that Turing advanced, the question to be considered in greater detail 
concerns the nature of algorithms. Given that one now has a working definition of the 
algorithm, one can begin to think about classifying problems, algorithms and computer 
programs by, for example, the time they take or the storage memory they may require to be 
executed. One may assume that the time required for an algorithm to run would depend on the 
type of machine, given that running a computer program on a Pentium PC is very different from 
executing it on a state-of-the-art super computer. This is why the concept of the Turing machine 
was so important-- because any answers to questions about problem and algorithm resources 
will only make sense if the computing device is always the same. And that device is none other 
than the universal Turing machine. So for example, every step that a Turing machine performs 
while reading its tape is counted as a time step. 
Many algorithms can arrive at the same conclusion taking different paths but some may 
be faster than others, but this is now a carefully considered matter when fixing the framework 
for Turing’s model of computation: one asks whether there is an algorithm that surpasses all 
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others in economy as regards the resources required when using exactly the same computing 
device. These are the questions that opened up an entire new field in the wake of Turing’s work, 
the development of which Turing would certainly have been delighted to witness. This field is 
today referred to as the theory of Computational Complexity, which would not have been 
possible without a concept such as that of the universal Turing machine. The theory of 
Computational Complexity focuses on classifying problems and algorithms according to the 
time they take to compute when larger inputs are considered, and on how size of input and 
execution time are related to each other. This is all connected to two basic resources needed in 
any computation: space (storage) and time. For example, one obvious observation relating to 
this theory is that no algorithm will need more space than time to perform a computation. One 
can then quickly proceed to ask more difficult but more interesting questions, such as whether a 
machine can execute a program faster if it is allowed to behave probabilistically instead of fully 
deterministically. What happens if one adds more than one tape to a universal Turing machine 
operation? Would that amount to implementing an algorithm to solve a problem much faster? 
Or one may even ask whether there is always an efficient algorithm for every inefficient 
algorithm, a question that may lead us to a fascinating topic connecting computers and physics. 
 
The world of simple programs 
 
If algorithms can come in a variety of types, some slow, others faster, what is it that 
allows nature to produce, with no apparent effort, what seem to us to be complex objects? (see 
Figs. 4, 5 and 6). These range from the laws of physics to the formation of matter and galaxies 
to the beginning of life on Earth (and possibly in other parts of the universe). In the end, one can 
see all these natural phenomena as a kind of computation, regardless of whether it is of exactly 
the same type as that performed by a Turing machine. This latter possibility cannot be 
completely disregarded. Thanks to Turing we know that even simple devices such as universal 
Turing machines possess incredible power. 
One of the natural world’s most fascinating characteristics is that it presents a wide 
range of physical and biological systems that behave in different ways, just like algorithms, 
most of them having some regular features while nonetheless being hard to predict. Climate is a 
case in point. Even though it is cyclical, it is impossible to predict its details more than a week 
in advance.  
Where does nature’s complexity come from? Throughout human history we have 
encountered objects, in particular mathematical ones that seem complex to us. One set of such 
objects comprises numbers that can de expressed as the division p/q, with p and q being 
integers. Numbers 5, 0.5 or even infinite numbers such as 0.333… can be written as 5/1, 1/2, 
and 1/3, respectively. But as far back as the ancient Greeks numbers have been known, such as 
π and the square root of 2, which cannot be expressed in this way. One could think of 
arithmetical division as an algorithm that can be performed by a Turing machine, the result 
being provided in the output tape. Multiplication, for example, is an algorithm to shorten the 
number of steps needed to perform the same operation using only addition. In the case of 
numbers that admit a rational representation p/q, the algorithm of the division of integers 
consists of the common procedure of finding quotients and remainders. In the case of numbers 
such as π and the square root of 2, the algorithm produces an infinite non-periodic expansion, so 
that the only way to represent them is symbolically (i.e. π and ). The Pythagoreans found that 
those numbers with ostensible infinite complexity could be produced from very simple 
operations, for example, when seeking the value of the hypotenuse of a right triangle with sides 
of length 1. Since Euclid, it has also been known that such numbers are not the exception among 
real numbers that are found, for example, in the continuous interval (0, 1). 
In algorithmic terms, rational and irrational numbers are different in nature. When one 
starts a Turing machine that implements the algorithm for division, there is no algorithm that 
allows for the production of an irrational number followed by halting, whereas the division of 
rational numbers can halt (when the remainder is zero) or enter an infinite cycle that will 
produce a repetitive decimal expansion. 
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In engineering, including systems programming, the intuition of what is complex (in 
comparison to an irrational number in mathematics, for example) has been radically different. 
The usual assumption has been that to produce something that seems complex, a process that is 
just as complex has to be devised. This issue, however, is closely connected to Turing’s concept 
of universality, given that a universal Turing machine that is programmable is, in principle, 
capable of producing any degree of ‘complexity’, for example, the type of complexity (or 
randomness) that one can see in the decimal expansion of π.  
If Euclid’s algorithm for division or π can produce such apparent complexity, how usual 
is it to run a random computer program that produces the same complexity? If computer 
programs that produce complexity need a very complex description, the probability of finding 
one small enough would be very low. For example, even though Turing’s 1936 article contains 
all the main elements of the traditional description of a universal Turing machine capable of 
reproducing the type of complexity to be found in the digits of π, the construction of his 
universal machine requires at least 18 states, and at least 23 instructions (the exact number 
cannot be calculated on the basis of Turing’s article due to the fact that he uses subroutines that 
can be implemented on machines of different sizes).  
Whatever the actual threshold for reaching Turing universality, it had typically been 
thought to be high (a case in point: von Neumann’s universal builder, a system that was the 
anticipation of the modern concept of cellular automata, requires 29 states), and it was thought 
that a universal machine would require a certain minimum complexity (at least as to the number 
of states and symbols required to describe it). In an experiment with extremely small and simple 
computer programs, Stephen Wolfram found that this threshold of complexity and universality 
was likely to be extremely low, and that very little was required to find a machine that produced 
high complexity or that was capable of being Turing universal. Wolfram’s computer programs 
called Elementary Cellular Automata with rule numbers 30 (Fig. 1) and 110 (Fig. 2) are the best 
examples of rich behaviour obtained from minimalistic computer programs. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of a simple program called Rule 30 (100 steps are shown in this image) that, 
surprisingly, generates apparent complexity in spite of starting with a single black cell (the simplest initial 
condition for this computer program). The icon at the top of the program’s evolution shows the transition 
table. Rule 30 is, by perhaps any standard, the simplest computer program that produces this degree of 
apparent disorder. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of a simple program called Rule 110 (100 steps shown) is capable of Turing 
universality due to the presence of persistent structures--some of which can be observed in this figure-- 
that allow for the transfer of information. This means that a rule as simple as this (the rule appears at the 
top) can compute any function that a Turing machine can compute. 
 
Certain parts of the universe seem ordered and structured. On Earth, for example, life is 
an example of organization and structure, contrasting with what can be deemed background 
noise (comparable to what appears on the screen of an old non-tuned analog television) left over 
by the Big Bang and serving as proof of the state in which the universe found itself after its first 
moments of existence. What Turing would probably never have guessed is that when running 
random Turing machines, the machines produce highly structured objects. Could this be merely 
an interesting analogy or could it perhaps be an actual indication that the universe is more 
algorithmic than initially expected?  If so, then Turing machines and computer programs are not 
just products of the human imagination, they are perhaps responsible for the order in the 
universe. Alan Turing may have had an intuitive answer to this question, as he was also 
interested in structure formation and helped found another area in biochemistry called 
Morphogenesis. Turing was interested in pattern formation, starting from a simple shape which 
would first break its symmetries at random. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Giant’s Causeway in Northern Ireland. Hexagonal basalt columns formed by sea 
water cooling incandescent lava relatively quickly, around 60 million years ago, as a result of the 
interplay of a small number of forces. (Picture, H. Zenil, 2009) 
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    Looking at Figs. 3 and 4, we may form the impression that the structures shown cannot 
possibly be the product of natural processes unassisted by human intervention. However, once 
we realise that, despite appearances, they are indeed structures that have been formed naturally,  
we accept that the process through which they have come into existence is neither exceptional 
nor complex, but  simple and relatively common. In Fig. 3, hexagonal columns can be seen that 
were formed from accumulated lava that was rapidly cooled as soon as it came in contact with 
sea water. In Fig. 4 we see a great white circle on the ground, a result of the growth of 
mushrooms. How do the mushrooms communicate with each other to arrange themselves in a 
circle? The first mushrooms in a ‘fairy ring’ emerge in the middle, and start reproducing 
outwards. The older mushrooms in the center die off whereas the younger mushrooms form 
even larger circles. Traditionally it has been thought that objects with structure can only be 
produced by an intelligent mind. How can nature create this structure? 
 
 
Figure 4. A ‘fairy ring’ on the ground is formed in a natural manner by the differential growth of 
Micelios mushrooms, i.e. an extremely simple mechanical process. (Picture, H. Zenil, Dundee, Scotland. 
2012) 
 
 
An algorithmic theory of emergence  
 
Just as the formulas for the production of the digits of π are compressed versions of π, 
the laws of physics can be seen as systems that compress natural phenomena. These laws are 
valuable because it is thanks to them that the result of a natural phenomenon can be predicted 
without having to wait for it to unfold in real time, e.g. one can solve the equations that describe 
planetary movement instead of waiting two years to know the future positions of a planet. For 
all practical purposes the laws of physics are like computer programs and the scientific models 
we have of them, executable on digital computers and susceptible of numerical solutions. 
 
There is a measure that describes the probability of a universal Turing machine 
producing a string s when running a computer program produced at random. In the form of an 
equation this measure can be written as follows, 
  
m(s) = 1
{ p:U ( p)=s}
∑ / 2|p|   (1) 
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In which |p| is the length (in bits) of the programs that produce the string s running on a 
universal Turing machine U. In order to work U has to fulfill a minimal technical requirement, 
viz. that no valid computer program is the beginning of another valid computer program. The 
measure m induces a distribution over the set of strings that is known as the Universal 
Distribution, the properties of which have even been described as ‘miraculous’ in the literature 
on computer theory.  
The notion behind m is very intuitive. If one wished to produce the digits of π 
randomly, one would have to try time after time until one managed to hit upon the first numbers 
corresponding to an initial segment of the decimal expansion of π. The probability of success is 
extremely small: 1/10 digits multiplied by the desired quantity of digits. For example, (1/10)2400 
for a segment of 2400 digits of π. But if instead of shooting out random numbers one were to 
shoot out computer programs to be run on a digital computer, the result would be very different. 
A program that produces the digits of π would have a higher probability of being produced by a 
computer program. Concise and known formulas for π could be implemented as short computer 
programs that would generate any arbitrary number of digits of π. 
It should be noted that the largest term in the sum of equation 1 is obtained when the 
denominator is the smallest, that is, when |p| is the smallest, namely the shortest length of 
program p in bits that produces s. 
Not coincidentally, the length of the shortest program that produces a string is 
acknowledged as a measure of randomness called algorithmic or Kolmogorov complexity. The 
idea is relatively simple. If a string of length s cannot be produced by a program that produces s 
so that |p| < |s| where |p| denotes the length of the program p in number of bits, then the string s 
is considered random because it cannot be described in a shorter way than by s itself, there 
being no program p that generates s whose length is shorter than s. Kolmogorov complexity is 
defined as follows: 
 
  (2) 
 
The measure of algorithmic probability m assigns a low algorithmic complexity to the 
strings that are produced more often, whereas those with a lower frequency have a greater 
Kolmogorov complexity, that is to say, they seem more random. 
The invariance theorem guarantees that the value of C, whether calculated with one 
particular universal Turing machine or any other universal Turing machine, is the same at the 
limit. Formally, if U1 and U2 are two universal Turing machines and CU1 (s)  and CU2 (s)  are the 
values for the algorithmic complexity of s for U1 and U2  respectively, there exists a constant c 
such that 
 
|CU1 (s)−CU2 (s) |< c    (3) 
 
Thus, the longer the string, the less important c is and the more stable the Kolmogorov 
complexity value C is. 
One of the disadvantages of C is that, given the halting problem for Turing machines, C 
is not computable, which is to say that given a string, there is no algorithm that returns the 
length of the shortest computer program that produces it. We have already seen how m(s) relates 
to C(s), given that according to its definition from Eq. 1, m obtains the greater part of its value 
from the shortest program that produces s. The Coding theorem formalises this relationship: 
 
C(s) ~ − log  m(s)    (4) 
 
The theorem indicates that the algorithmic complexity of a string s is very close (up to 
an additive constant) to the negative value of the logarithm of the frequency of s. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Running random programs can be seen as the simulation of a hypothetical binary 
universe that, besides constituting an alternative to compression algorithms, affords us a 
framework for studying and comparing with the real world, with the way in which patterns in 
the universe are distributed. In a world of computable processes in which the laws (like 
programs) do not have a slantwise distribution, m(s) would indicate the probability of a natural 
phenomenon occurring as a result of running a program. Distribution m(s) has an interesting 
particularity: it can start from basically anything, and, like a robust distribution, it remains 
qualitatively unchanged. It is the process that determines the form of the distribution and not the 
initial distribution of the programs. This is important because one does not make any strong 
initial assumption about the distribution of the initial conditions or of the laws of physics. 
Computer programs can be looked at from a certain vantage point as laws of physics. If 
one starts with a random initial condition (input) and executes a program chosen at random, 
there is a very good probability that its final appearance will be regular, and frequently very 
well organised. By the same token if one were to shoot out particles at random, the probability 
of groups forming in the way they do would be so small--in the absence of laws of physics--that 
nothing whatsoever would happen in the universe. Perhaps Alan Turing hasn’t only helped us 
understand the world of computing machines and computing programs, founding an entire 
scientific area, but has also taught us a great deal about the universe in which we live and how it 
came to be the way it is. 
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